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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ED CASSITY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
8794

vs.

J. J. CASTAGNO,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment on a verdict with the
case having been submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. The Complaint was filed by appellant, to which the
respondent filed his counterclaims, with appellant thereafter
filing cross-claims to respondent's counterclaims. The parties
own intermingled and adjacent range and ranch lands in
Tooele County, Utah, and the action and counter actions have
3
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been mainly to restrain each from making any use of the lands
of the other and, incidentally, to secure damages growing out
of past use of each other's lands and for small amounts allegedly
due as the result of minor relationships relating to past use
and improvement of the lands involved.
Money damages were found by the verdict and provided
in the judgment for each party against the other in exactly the
same amount.
The interrogatories propounded to the jury and their
answers thereto constituting the verdict are as follows:
"We the Jury in the above entitled case find the answers
to the following interrogatories as follows:
1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant trespassed upon the lands of the plaintiff during
the period between May 31, 1952, and May 31, 1955 ? (Answer
yes or no.) Answer Yes.
2. If your answer to the question One above is "yes,"
what damages, if any, do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence the plaintiff has suffered by reason of such trespass
or trespasses? Amount $250.00.
3. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff trespassed upon the lands of the defendant during
the period between November 15, 1952 and November 15,
1955? (Answer yes or no.) Answer Yes.
4. If your answer to Three above is "yes," what damages,
if any, do you find by a preponderance of the evidence, the
defendant has suffered by reason of such trespass or trespasses?
Amount $250.00.

4
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5. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant and the plaintiff entered into a contract dealing
with the grazing of defendant's lands by the plaintiff on Stansbury Island? (Answer yes or no.) Answer No.
6. If your answer to No. 5 above, is yes, what amount,
if any, do you find the plaintiff owes the defendant? Amount
None.
7. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant and the plaintiff entered into a contract dealing
furnishing wire to build a fence? (Answer yes or no.) Answer
No.
8. If your answer to No. 7 above was yes, what amount,
if any, do you find the plaintiff owes the defendant? Answer
None.
9. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership and possession
drove or trailed their cattle across the defendant's lands in
going to and from Stansbury Island? Answer yes or no.)
Answer Yes.
10. If your answer to No. 9 is yes, answer the following
questions:
a. Prior to May 3, 1955, did the plaintiff and his predecessor in ownership and possession regularly use the defendant's
land for that purpose for 20 consecutive years? (Answer yes
or no.) Answer Yes.
b. Did the trail, if any, follow the same general course
and direction during the 20 year period referred to in the next
preceding question ? Answer Yes.
5
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11, Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used the lands
of the defendant in Section 9 and 22, Township 2 South,
Range 5 West, and the water holes, if any, upon said lands to
water his cattle for a period of 20 consecutive years prior to
May 31, 1955? Answer Yes.
a. If your answer to No. 11 is yes, answer the following
question:
For how many consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955,
has the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used said
lands and water holes? Answer 50 years.
Dated this 17th day of January, 1957.
/ s / Ross Gown."
In addition to the above findings of the Jury the Court
made findings of fact independent thereof. From its judgment
determining that appellant owns no rights to the use of water
located upon respondent's lands; from its further determination
that appellant has acquired no right to trail across or otherwise
use respondent's lands, and from the judgment determining
the ownership and use of the lands involved the appellant
brings this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cassity, the plaintiff and appellant, is a cattleman operating several hundred head of cattle upon the lands which were
formerly used in this identical cattle operation by his fatherin-law, John Castagno, (R 116) deceased. (R 5, 8, 131, 225,
169,301, 117).
6
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Castagno, the defendant and respondent herein, is the
oldest son (R 115) of the said John Castagno, and the parties
herein are brothers-in-law (R 5), Cassity having married the
daughter of the deceased, John Castagno (R 142).
After the death of his father, the defendant herein acquired ownership and leasehold control of said lands which
are so intermingled with the lands his brother-in-law, Cassity,
had acquired from the estate of his father that a use is made
of these lands and the waters located upon them by the Cassity
Cattle (R 117, 118, 119, 120, 170, 193-4, 70, 71).
The case involves range lands and the waters located
upon those lands and the rights as between the parties to use
those properties (pleadings; verdict). As to a part of these
properties the holdings of the parties are so intermingled
that it is not possible for either to use his own property without
using that of the other (Ex. I, R 169, 193-4, 198, 285, 163-5,
167). And it is not possible for Cassity to get back and forth
between the winter range and the summer range areas without
trailing his cattle across a part of the lands owned by Castagno
(R 70-71, 94, 95, 102, 104, 107, 284). The lands owned by
the parties are as is shown in appropriate color on Exhibit I
(R 116, 117, 122, 123, 126-8). The lands shown in blue
thereon are owned and are under the control of Cassity and
those shown in pink are owned by Castagno (R 116-117).
Those shown in green, yellow and purple are leased by
Castagno (R 116-117). Those shown in green, yellow and
purple are leased by Castagno (R 114). The lands left without
color are either owned by third parties or they are a part of
the remaining public domain (Ex. I, R 122).

7
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While the other holdings of the parties and related areas
are shown on the Exhibit I map the area with which we are
almost exclusively concerned in this appeal is that area which is
bounded on Exhibit I by the blue colored lands and by the south
shore of Great Salt Lake located in Township 2 South, Range
5 West, and that area within Sections 7, 18 and 19 along the
extreme westernmost tier of Sections in Township 2 South,
Ronge 4 West, SLM (R 222, 237-8). A fence beginning on
the shore of Great Salt Lake extends due south along the east
side of said Sections 7, 18 and 19 (R 157) to the north
boundary of the State Highway, (R 11) where it joins the
fence extending along the north side of said highway to the
east side of the right of way of the Tooele Branch of the
Western Pacific Railroad (R 12). This right of way is then
fenced northwesterly to the juncture of this Branch Line with
the Main Line of the Western Pacific Railroad (R 12, 13).
The north line of this area is naturally fenced by the swampy
mud flats of the shores of Great Salt Lake. This considerable
area is enclosed by the above described boundary fence (R 11,
12, 13). The Cassity and the Castagno lands colored in Sections 16, 20, 21, 27, 28, Township 2 South, Range 5 West,
which are along the west side of the right-of-way of the Tooele
Branch of the Western Pacific Railroad are separately fenced
dividing the said Cassity from the Castagno lands. A fence
also extends along the west line of said right-of-way which
forms a part of the fence of the Cassity lands located along
the west side of this right-of-way. One place only is provided
where livestock may be taken across this right-of-way from
the Cassity lands on the east side thereof to those located west
of that railroad line. Gates are set in the fence line to be used
8
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for this purpose in Section 22, T. 2 S., R. 5 W., SLM (Ex. 1,
R 102, 103, 104).
The appellant Cassity and the respondent Castagno are
brothers in law (R 5). Their respective fathers-in-law and
:ather formerly owned the lands with which we are involved
lere (R 5, 115, 292), and upon the distribution of his estate
n about 1939 (R 109) Cassity bought the interests of each
leir, including the interest of respondent, in the estate lands,
md so came into the ownership of the ranch and range land
loldings of his wife's father (R 6, 8-10, 109, 121). This
)roperty has been used as a cattle ranch for about the last
'5 years by the appellant and his predecessor, his father-inaw (R 95, 104, 112, 133). Several hundred head of cattle
md horses have been operated upon these lands (R 131, 225),
md are now operated by appellant (R. 169, 301). During
he summer season the Cassity livestock graze upon meadow
ands located within a fenced area east of the branch line of
Western Pacific and north of the State Highway and in Townhip 2 South, Range 5 West, the west side of the line of
vhich is 4.2 miles east of the community of Grantsville,
Jtah (Ex I ) . Upon lands within this same area hay is harested and stacked which is fed to the calves while they are
»eing weaned from the cows during the winter season, and
lso used to feed such animals as need to be fed hay during
he winter. During the winter season all other Cassity livetock are trailed from the above summer grazing meadows
cross the low lying lands near the shore of Great Salt Lake
or about 20 miles to Stansbury Island (R 128-29, V9-10a.., R 286). Here they graze upon lands owned by Cassity and
lso upon adjacent public domain lands for the grazing of
9
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which Cassity holds a grazing permit issued by the Government. During the winter grazing season such cattle as become
poor on this island and require hay are trailed back along
this same trail to the hay and meadow lands heretofore described which adjoin the south end of Great Salt Lake (R
251-2), and all of the remaining livestock are trailed back
from this winter range to the summer grazing meadows in the
spring of each year (R 128-29, V9, VlO a.b.).* This has
been the method of grazing and moving this same outfit of
cattle in their year-long operation for the last 75 years and
for so long as it has been in existence.
The route over which these cattle have been trailed between the winter and the summer range has been along a
well-defined route as indicated with a pencil mark on Exhibit
I, ever since this cattle operation began under the ownership
of Cassity's father-in-law (R 70-71, 273, 294, 302, 308).
From the meadows in Township 2 South, Range 5 West, it
extended northwesterly through Sections 23, 15, 9, 10, 4 and
5 of this township into that triangular shaped parcel of land
in the east half of the said section 5 which adjoins on the east
the branch line of the Western Pacific Railroad (Ex. I, R 7071, 250-52, 294, 308). This parcel of land is separately enclosed with a fence along the boundary lines of the area
colored in blue in the shape of a triangle in Section 5 of this
township (R 283-4) on Exhibit I. It constitutes the overnight
holding pasture used by Cassity when these cattle are being
driven from one range to the other, particularly when they
are being taken from the summer to the winter range (R 143,
*=Verdict
10
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284). The cattle cannot be taken the entire distance from the
summer to the winter range in one day and unless they are
kept confined during the night (R 303) in an enclosure they
will, before the following morning, drift back to the range
from which they have been last moved (R 284, 143). A very
considerable amount of additional horseback riding would then
be required to gather the cattle and get them back on the trail
moving in the direction of their destination. There is no other
practical trail or route over which these cattle may be trailed
between these range areas (R 254, 284, 286). Fenced fields
with no lanes or roads stand in the way of taking these cattle
due west from the Cassity summer meadows to the road which
extends north to the winter range (Ex. I, R 252-4). Because
of the heavy automobile traffic along the State Highway which
bounds the summer meadows and hay lands on the south, the
cattle cannot safely, if at all, be trailed along this route through
the town of Grantsville to the road which leads north into
the winter range area. Also the distance around this State Highway route would be unreasonably longer than that which has
been used these many decades (Ex. l ) . And the route used
in the past is open so that there is no interference with the
free and easy movement of the livestock which can, when
extremely harsh conditions develop on the winter range, trail
back to the hay yards of their own volition and without any
person being required to be attending them (R 253-4, 265).
This is a very considerable advantage in this operation. It
is to be noted from Exhibit 1 that the route of this trail within
the fenced area east of the Tooele Branch line of the Western
Pacific Railroad is largely across lands owned by Castagno,
and along the major portion of which trail Cassity owns little
11
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or no land (Ex. l ) . These Castagno lands have never been
fenced, except for the fact that a temporary fence was once
constructed around a part of that 80-acre tract in about 1935
which was acquired by Castagno as a homestead (R 62, 63).
Cassity became manager of the estate of his father-in-law upon
the death of the latter in 1928 (R 61) and he continued to
operate this livestock outfit in that capacity until he acquired
all interest of the heirs in that estate in about 1939 (R 61,
121, 122). Since that time he has operated it as sole proprietor
(R 169). Castagno's only work with cattle within this area
was with his father's cattle. He left his father's ranch as a
young man and went to California where he remained for
about 7 years (R 6, 224, 225), returning upon his father's
death in 1928 (R 61) to this ranch where he worked for a
time under Cassity (R 62). Sometime after the estate was
distributed in about 1949 (R 145), Castagno acquired a small
number of cattle, but his operations have not been within the
area of the hay fields nor meadows of Cassity enclosed by fence
east of the branch railroad line (R 144). Castagno has
operated this small number of cattle upon the lands both to
the east and to the west of the Casisty lands, indicated as being
under the ownership or leasehold control of Castagno (Ex.
1, R 144, 227-8). Castagno has, with permission of Cassity,
trailed his livestock back and forth through the Cassity lands
as necessity required in moving them back and forth from
his holdings on either side of the Cassity lands in T. 2 S.,
R. 5 W. (R 145, 147).
Upon parts of these lands colored in pink on Exhibit 1,
owned by Castagno, and located in Sections 4, 9, 10, 15 and
12
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22, water holes fed by springs are located (R 84, 88, 175,
178-9, 181, 192, 231, 256-57, 279, 281, 295, 309, 314, 316).
These springs never dry up, but the quantity of water they
produce varies with the wet and dry years (R 84, 175, 255-56,
279, 281-295, 304). These waters are good for livestock use
and have been used by the Cassity cattle and horses and by
those of his predecessor (his father-in-law) each and every
year next preceding this lawsuit for 75 years or more (R 83,
84, 88, 256, 279, 295, 309). With these lands of Castagno
having been open all of this time the cattle have used them
as freely in all ways as they have used the lands owned by
Cassity for all of this period of time (R 256) and the water
holes are important and of value in the grazing of the Cassity
cattle (R 255-57, 311). Indeed it is not possible to graze
livestock in this area without having them regularly use these
waters, and their use is required in making the most efficient
grazing utilization of the forage produced upon the Cassity
lands (R 255-57).
Whenever Cassity grazes the lands he owns which are
enclosed by fence and which are located in this same township
2 South, Range 5 West, along the west side of the said branch
railroad line he must drive them into this area from his larger
fenced area on the east side of the fence (R 258). In making
this movement of cattle it has been his practice, and that of
his predecessor, for these 75 years or more to drive them
across the Castagno lands located in sections 22 and 15
of this same township, through the gates in the railroad fence
and into his pastures on the west side of the right-of-way.
They have been returned to the big pasture area in the same
13
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manner (R 258-59). This has been and remains the only
natural and practical way to move the livestock between these
areas (R 259).
All of this use over these years by Cassity and his predecessor of the lands now owned by Castagno and of the waters
located upon those lands has been without the consent or
permission of the owners of these lands having been given
(R 286-87), except that since the enactment of the Taylor
Grazing Act in 1934 and until Castagno acquired these public
domain lands in Sec. 15 Cassity was granted a license by the
government to graze these lands, and paid a fee for that use.
Of these lands which are owned by Castagno those which
are colored in pink and within the area designated by the
numeral 5 were public domain lands down to the time they
were acquired by Castagno from the government in 1953
(R 118). The lands similarly colored and designated with
the numeral 2 form a part of the Castagno homestead and
the patent to those lands was issued in February, 1939 (R 170),
but it was not shown when the Castagno application for homestead was approved. The law provides that three years shall
intervene between the filing and the making proof to the government in compliance with regulations which warrant the
issuance of patent (43 USCA 164). As to the lands owned
by Castagno in Section 22 and designated with the numeral
3, they were purchased by him from Seigel-Williams in 1944
(R 119). An important water hole is located upon these lands,
used by the Cassity livestock for more than 75 years (R 25, 67).
As against the approximately 5700 acres (Ex. 1) of lands
owned by Cassity, in the area south of Great Salt Lake with
14
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which we are particularly concerned, they will adequately
feed for at least six months not less than 350 head of cattle
(R 131) and approximately 100 horses (R 225), and the
barren lands of respondent, including the lands he leases
within the said Cassity land area, will feed 10 head of cattle
for six months (R 80, 174-75, 269, 285). Some of these
Castagno lands are barren (R 175). While Cassity grazes
these lands as well as his Stansbury Island lands each year
in a continuing livestock operation (R 280, 286), Castagno
takes no livestock to Stansbury Island (R 128), does not use
the lands under his control east of the branch line of the
Western Pacific in T 2 S, R 5 W., (R 162) but only trails
his cattle across the Cassity lands in this fenced area of this
township (R 145, 147). Castagno grazes only a comparatively
small number of cattle (R 147) and moves them across the
Cassity lands which are between the lands he leases which
are located to the east and to the west of these Cassity lands
(R 145-47).
Castagno held no lands except his 80-acre homestead (R
170) within the area with which we are particularly concerned, which is east of the branch line of the Western Pacific
Railroad and west of the east line of the Section 7 lying next
east of that line and all of which area is in T. 2 S., R. 4 and
5 W., until 1944 when he acquired the 200 acres in Section
22, T. 2 S., R. 5 W., (R 119, Ex. 1). Thereafter he acquired
the 1,000 acres of public domain from the government in
1953 (R 118). While Castagno did not receive the patent to
his 80-acre homestead within this area until February 16,
1939 (R 170) it is likely that he had filed his entry upon this
15
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land prior to 1933 because he endeavored to cut hay from this
acreage in 1933 or 1935 (R 272).
Along with his brothers, Castagno had sold to Cassity his
interest in the lands of the estate of his deceased father in
November of 1939 (R 121), the very year Castagno had
already secured the patent to this 80-acre homestead (R 170).
Castagno had agreed also to sell this 80 acres to Cassity, but
thereafter refused to sell on the previously arranged terms
(R 9-10). Castagno grew up in this cattle outfit and knew the
location and relative relationship of the lands in this area
(R 6, 7, 145, 147). Mrs. Cassity is his sister (R 142). Feelings
of hostility have grown out of their relationship (R 199)A permanent road and trail has existed through these
lands for many years (R 158, 159, 194, 195-96, 229, 250,
251, 273, 309).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED A RIGHT TO
THE USE OF WATER LOCATED UPON RESPONDENT'S
LANDS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO TRAIL
HIS LIVESTOCK OVER AND ACROSS THE LANDS OF
RESPONDENT.
16
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THE LAND OWNERSHIP OF RESPONDENT.
POINT V
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROHIBITING
APPELLANT FROM TRAILING HIS LIVESTOCK ACROSS
A PORTION OF RESPONDENT'S LAND, TO WIT, SWy4NE& AND NW^SEVi OF SECTION 15, IN THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM DENYING APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF WAY
THEREIN.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED A RIGHT TO
THE USE OF WATER LOCATED UPON RESPONDENT'S
LANDS.
Under this point, while it is not made clearly to appear
from the language of the Judgment or from the Findings of
the Trial Court, four separate conditions are suggested to
control in the determinations of the Judgment that Cassity
could not acquire any right to the use of these waters. These are:
17
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1. Has the period of use by Cassity been for such a continuous period of time that a diligence right has
come into existence?
2. May one acquire the right to use waters upon privately owned lands of another which waters rise
and remain in a pool upon those lands?
3. May one acquire the right to use such waters as described in 2 above which are located upon public
domain, and if so, does the right continue after the
public domain passes into private ownership?
4. Are the waters here of a type and a quality which
can be put to beneficial use?
The questions presented will be considered in the above
order.
1. Has the period of use by Cassity been for such a continuous period of time that a diligence right has come into
existence? It is clear that Cassity and his wife's father, his
predecessor in interest, used the ranch involved within which
the Castagno lands are located, and upon which lands the
waters involved are located for 75 consecutive years or more
immediately prior to the filing of this case. The testimony bears
this out. The fact that the verdict of the jury in its answer to
question 11 (a) shows that the waters had been used for 50
years is not to be strictly interpreted. There is no evidence
that the waters had been used for 50 years, and no evidence
from which the jury could make any reasonable inference or
deduction that the use had been for 50 years or for any lesser
period of time. It is apparent that the jury used the term 50
years to represent their judgment that the use had been for a
long period; for the period contended by Cassity, and not to
18
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mean for the number of years which the figure 50, when
strictly construed, would mean.
The 75 year period of use which is well supported by
the evidence would reach back to about the year 1880 for
the beginning of this period of use. This is well in advance
of the year 1903, during which year the statute was enacted
which now governs the methods and procedures to be followed
in the appropriation of water rights. There is no contest here
as to who first put the water to beneficial use. Proof that one
had beneficially used water for several years prior to 1903
will suffice to show an appropriation. Salt Lake City Water
and Electrical Power Co. v. Salt Lake City and Ann Cannon,
25 Utah 441, 71 P. 1067 (1903).
Even though a right initiated prior to 1903 had not been
completed when the statute of that year was enacted the right
may nevertheless be perfected. Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch,
76 Utah 356, 289 P. 1097.
2. May one acquire the right to use waters upon privately
owned lands of another which waters rise and remain in a
pool upon those lands ? The evidence is clear, except as to the
lands in Section 22, here that all of the lands now owned by
Castagno within the area south of Great Salt Lake (the area
in question) were all a part of the public domain during the
time they were appropriated. The 80-acre homestead was not
patented until 1939, although it was filed upon sometime
prior to 1933 or 1935, and the 1,000 acres of "exchange"
lands were acquired from the government in 1953. No testimony was developed as to when the lands in Section 22 were
patented. The waters are located upon the lands in Sections 9,
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15 and 22, and possibly upon other of the public domain lands
which were conveyed to Castagno in 1953.
3. May one acquire the right to use such waters as described in 2 above which are located upon public domain,
and if so, does the right continue after the public domain
passes into private ownership? One who beneficially uses
water upon public domain acquires an easement in the land
for the purpose of continuing his use, and one who later
acquires the land from the government takes it subject to this
easement and subject to the appropriators's right to use the
water. Sullivan v. The Northern Spy Mining Company, 11
Utah 438, 40 P 709, 30 LRA 186 (1895). While there had
formerly been a question as to whether one could acquire the
right to use waters located upon the lands of aonther which
waters never flowed off those lands, such waters have always
been available for appropriation where located upon the public
domain. Deseret v. Hoopiana, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479, (1925).
4. Are the waters here of a type and quality which can
be put to beneficial use? Water may be appropriated through
the use made by livestock drinking directly from the open,
natural stream, without any diversion of the waters being required. Adams v. Portage Irrigation Reservoir & Power, 95
Utah 1, 72 P2d 648, (1938).
The Judgment of the trial Court provides that the waters
here are not a type or quality which can be appropriated without specifying any reasons to support that position. The
testimony of all of the witnesses, except Castagno himself,
is to the effect that the waters issue from the earth in the
center of pools, that these waters never dry up, and that they
20
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have been regularly used for many years by cattle and horses.
The trial Court, in its findings, determines that the waters
are waste waters, surface or percolating water "produced by
rain water and melting snows." It is submitted that all water
outside the seas is produced by rain or by melting snows. There
is no evidence that any of these waters are waste waters. The
witness for Castagno, Marcellus Palmer, testified that the basins
in which these waters were found were oval, slightily elevated
basins. How then could run-off water enter them?
As to the quality of the waters the evidence is substantial
and not to be disregarded that the cattle and horses had consumed this water for many years. Quality of the water has
nothing to do with the question as to whether it may be appropriated, so long as it can be put to a beneficial use. And its
consumption by livestock is such a use.
The Findings of Fact of the trial Court are to the effect
in Paragraph 19 that "a small proportion of this water is
probably water which percolates and has percolated through
the soil of defendant's lands," suggesting that waters which
course through the lands of one party may not be the subject
of appropriation by another. There is no merit to this position.
Springs are defined as those places where water issues naturally
from the earth's surface, and such waters, without regard to
the quantity, may be appropriated. Homan v. Christensen, 73
Utah 389, 274 P. 457 (1929). The waters of a spring may
be appropriated just as any other surface water. It is immaterial whether these spring waters percolate to the surface
or flow to the surface through a subterranean channel. Peterson
v. Lund, 57 Utah 162, 193 P 1087, (1920). The old common
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law rule relating to percolating waters has never been adopted
in this state. Wrathell v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P2d 755,
(1935), Home v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 P
815, (1921), Stookey v. Green, 53 Utah 311, 178 P 586,
(1919).
There is also no merit to the trial Court's finding that
no known and defined subterranean channel exists upon defendant's lands. Certainly if no water issuing from the earth
could be appropriated until the appropriator could prove the
existence or the location of the underground course it followed prior to reaching its point of issuance, no waters of
this class would ever have been appropriated.
There is no showing in the testimony that these waters
had been previously appropriated, and so could not be subject
to appropriation by Cassity or his predecessors. The statement
in the Findings of the trial Court that no attempt had been
made to appropriate the waters under the statutes of the
state is quite meaningless in view of the fact that the appropriation is clearly shown to have been accomplished through
a diligence claim which came into existence prior to the enactment of statutes governing this matter. It appears that the
Court was straining to find anything upon which to base a
rejection of the theory that Cassity owned the right to the
use of these waters in his livestock operation, and indulged
in Findings totally unsupported by the evidence in some instances, and unrelated to the problem in others.
If distinction is to be made between waters located upon
privately owned as against waters located upon public domain,
it is to be kept in mind that these lands were public domain,
except for Section 22, during the time these water rights were
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initiated and perfected. In paragraph 20 of the Findings by
the trial Court it is stated "the evidence completely fails to
establish the user of said water for the purposes aforesaid
by plaintiff and his predecessors in title and interest prior to
May 11, 1903, for the prescriptive period of 20 years." The
law, at no time, required the use to have been for 20 years
prior to the enactment of the 1903 statute in order to appropriate waters. Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Co.
v. Salt Lake City and Ann Cannon, 25 Utah 441, 71 P 1067,
(1903), Patterson v. Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 P 118, (1910),
Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356, 289 P 1097, (1930).

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO TRAIL
HIS LIVESTOCK OVER AND ACROSS THE LANDS OF
RESPONDENT.
In addition to the right acquired by Cassity to have his
livestock trail into and from the waters located upon the
Castagno lands, additional easements have been acquired in
these lands in trailing the livestock back and forth to the
winter range lands located on Stansbury Island, about 20 miles
from the area involved here on the south end of Great Salt
Lake, which constitutes the summer pasture meadows as well
as the hay producing lands. Also Cassity has acquired an easement to move his livestock back and forth between his holdings
south of the said lake which are located on the east side of
the Western Pacific right of way, and those which are located
on the west side of that fenced right of way. This easement
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has been acquired across the lands embraced within the 80acre homestead in Section 15, as well as across the lands owned
by Castagno in Section 22, since they became privately owned
lands. This right across these lands was created by prescription.
There is an additional creation of a right to trail the livestock
across the said homestead and across the Castagno lands in
Sections 4, 9, 10 and 15, by reason of the establishment of a
public road across those lands. This public road problem will
be discussed herein following the discussion of the creation
of an easement since the 80 acres in Section 15 and the Castagno
lands in Section 22 became privately owned.
As to the 80-acre homestead it may be conceded that
patent to this tract was not issued by the government to
Castagno until February, 1939, as is set forth in paragraph 10
of the Findings of Fact. But the date of the patent is not the
governing date fixing the earliest date for the running of the
prescriptive period. The prescriptive period begins to run upon
the approval of the application for the homestead which is
filed with the U. S. Land Office. The trial Court would not
permit evidence to go into the record to specifically show the
date this homestead entry was made at least 20 years before
the action herein was commenced (R 272). As of the time
of the approval of a homestead entry the entryman acquires
the exclusive right to possession of the land and to the enjoyment of its products; he may sue for trespass committed upon
the lands, and the equitable title belongs to him with the
government holding the naked legal title until the patent is
issued, at which time the full legal and equitable title in the
land merge, 73 CJS page 691, Public Lands, Sec. 41. The
period for prescription begins to run from the time some act
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is done which gives the party against whom the right of easement is claimed, a cause of action. 28 CJS Eastments, par. 6,
page 642.
The period of prescription in Utah is 20 years. Morris
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 245, 161 P 1129; Lunt v. Kitchins, 260
P2d 535, 1953. The evidence is clear and the trial Court made
a Finding (paragraph 15) that Cassity had trailed across these
lands for 20 years prior to the bringing of this action. The
evidence is clearly that this use had been made for 75 years,
and not merely for 20 years.
As to the lands located in Section 22 owned by Castagno,
it is certain that these lands except for the NW%NW^4 have
been in private ownership for more than the necessary 20year period prior to the commencement of this action (R
258-59). Here, too, the trial Court refused to permit testimony
to show the use of these lands in Section 22 (R 259-63). It
is not claimed that these lands in Section 22 were used in
trailing the cattle to and from the winter range on Stansbury
Island, but it is set forth in the complaint and attempt was
made (R 258-62) to prove the use made by Cassity and his
predecessors in moving the cattle across these lands in taking
them back and forth between the lands on the west and on the
east side of the railroad track of the Western Pacific in T.
2 S., R. 5 W., SLM.
As a further basis for the right on the part of Cassity
to use the lands of Castagno in his livestock trailing operations
in moving to and from the lands south of Great Salt Lake and
the winter ranges on Stansbury Island, a public road has existed
across these lands, except for those in Section 22, for many
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years and which was established across them during the time
these lands were a part of the public domain. The evidence
discloses that this road was used many years ago in construction of the telegraph line along the main line of the railroad,
in moving vehicles back and forth between Stansbury Island
and the ranges north of the town of Tooele by the early settlers. Cassity and his father-in-law have used this old road
and trail for more than 75 years in driving livestock, and in
taking supplies by wagon to and from Stansbury Island, and
in hauling wood back from that island to the home ranch in
T. 2 S., R. 5 W. This use has been for many years more than
the period required for the establishment of this road. The
use made of this road was by many persons in past years and
has been as general and extensive as the situation and surroundings would permit. The road followed a reasonably
certain route over these lands, without undue deviation as is
shown on Exhibit 1, and as testified to by all of Cassity's
witnesses, all of whom had used this trail.
By act of Congress passed in 1866, Revised Statutes U.S.
Sec. 2477 (43 USCA Sec. 932), it was provided: "The right
of way for the construction of highways over public lands,
not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."
It has been held by this Act the government consented
that any of its lands not reserved for a public purpose might
be taken and used for public roads. "The statute was a standing
offer of a free right of way over the public domain, and as
soon as it was accepted in an appropriate manner by the agents
of the public, or the public itself, a highway was established/'
Streeter v. Stalnaker, 61 Neb. 205, 85 N.W. 47.
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The grant for the roadway over the public lands may be
accepted by public use without formal action by public authorities. Use for 5 years was all the use required in Utah as provided in Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1880, and by Chapter 12,
Laws of Utah, 1886, Sec. 2, it was provided:
"All roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or
dedicated by others than the public and dedicated or
abandoned to the use of the public are highways. A
highway shall be deemed and taken as dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously and uninterruptedly used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years/'
Under this set of circumstances a public road is established in which the members of the public acquire an easement
for their use. Lindsey Land & Livestock Co. v. Chournos, 75
U 384, 285 Pac 646, Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P2d 422.
And one who acquires title to lands upon which a highway, as herein, has been established takes title subject to this
easement. U. S. v. Pruden, 172 F2d 503-05 (10th Circuit
1949), which cites the above cited Chournos and Bertagnole
cases.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE.
The trial Court erred in excluding evidence during the
trial. Among the errors committed in preventing testimony to
be offered in behalf of Cassity are the following:
1. The Court would not permit testimony on behalf of
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Cassity to show that he had used the lands owned by Castagno
over the years (R 262-63). This proof was a necessity in order
to establish the creation of an easement in the lands.
2. The Court restricted proof on the element of damage
(R 270).
3. The Court would not allow proof in behalf of Cassity
that his predecessor, his father-in-law, had used and operated
these properties inside the fence south of the lake (R 280-81).
It was material and competent to show the use of the previous
owner of the property, who is dead, in order to tie the use
from one owner to the next, to establish the creation of the
easements which Cassity claimed had come into existence to
use Castagno's lands.
4. The Court refused to allow testimony in behalf of
Cassity that was intended to prove that, as to the water holes
located on the Castagno lands, they contained water all through
in the driest year ever on record, the year 1956 (R 282, 283).
Therewas a conflict in the testimony about the quantity of water
which was in the alleged water holes, whether the water was
available for livestock use, or whether the holes were dry
most of the time. Proof should have been permitted to go in
that, although 1956 was a year subsequent to the filing of the
complaint, the water holes contained water all through that
dry year. This would go to prove the continuous availability
of water in the water holes.
5. The Court would not allow testimony to show when
the Castagno 80-acre homestead in Section 15 was filed upon
(R 287). This was material to Cassity's case because the
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period of prescription begins to run as of the time the filing
is made, and not as of the time the patent is issued by the
Government. The filing precedes the patent.
6. The Court would not allow counsel for Cassity to pursue
questioning of Castagno, designed to aid in proving an estoppel, that he had agreed to sell his homestead to Cassity if he
should buy out the lands and livestock of the estate of
Castagno's father (R 10-11).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THE LAND OWNERSHIP OF RESPONDENT.
The trial Court made findings (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, page 3) that Castagno owns and has
owned for all times herein the following described lands:
T. 2 South, Range 5 West, SLM
Sec. 22, (NW 1 / 4 NE 1 / 4 ), ( N E ^ N W ^ ) , NW%NW%,
(SW%NW%), SE%NW%, SW%NE%,

(wy 2 swy4), NEiAsw1/^ Ny2SEy4.
The said Court made the same determination as to land
ownership in its Judgment (page 3) and entered its restraining order prohibiting Cassity from using any of the above
described lands. As a matter of fact, and in accordance with
the testimony, Cassity owns and has owned, for all times herein,
the 200 acres of the above described lands which are enclosed
with brackets. The Exhibit 1 clearly shows this contention to
be the fact, and there is no testimony anywhere in the record
to support this Finding or this part of the Judgment. Although
this was brought to the attention of the trial Court in written
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briefs in support of the motion for a new trial which was filed
in behalf of Cassity, and in that motion, the Court refused to
make any change in its Findings or in its Judgment.
As the situation now stands Cassity is prohibited and
restrained from making a trailing use of the lands owned
by Castagno over which he has clearly established the right
to trail back and forth to the winter range on Stansbury Island,
and between his lands east and those west of the spur line of
Western Pacific Railroad, and to get to and from the water
holes which he and his predecessor, father-in-law, used for
75 continuous years, but this Judgment restrains Cassity from
using lands which he owns and to the use of which there is
no evidence to support any claim whatsoever by Castagno.
POINT V
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROHIBITING
APPELLANT FROM TRAILING HIS LIVESTOCK ACROSS
A PORTION OF RESPONDENT'S LAND, TO WIT, SWV4NE!/4 AND NW%SE% OF SECTION 15, IN THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM DENYING APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF WAY
THEREIN.
The evidence adduced below indicates clearly that prior
to the acquisition by appellant of the livestock now owned
by appellant respondent clearly indicated to appellant that
upon payment by appellant of the debts and obligations of
the Castagno estate and upon acquisition of the livestock
therefrom by appellant, respondent would then sell to appellant an 80-acre tract of land, to-wit, SW^NEVi, NW^SE 1 ^
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of Section 15 (R 10-11). The evidence and the natural inferences to be drawn therefrom is abundantly clear that in reliance
upon respondent's promise appellant did in fact discharge
the debts and obligations of said estate and did purchase
and did acquire the said livestock, and thereafter continued to
trail said cattle across said tract of land as had been done in the
past in reasonable expectation that the said land would be conveyed unto him. Respondent, on the other hand, after the payment of said debts and obligations and after the acquisition of
said herd by appellant, failed and refused to honor his promise,
and has in fact, gone one step further by asserting the right to
prevent appellant from trailing said cattle across his lands.
Under the facts and evidence as stated above, it appears
abundantly clear that the elements of an equitable promissory
estoppel are present and that to deny appellant the right to
trail said cattle across said lands would be unfair, inequitable
and unconscionable by reason of his change of position and
reasonable reliance upon respondent's promise to convey said
lands.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been defined as
follows:
"Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary
conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded
both at law and in equity from asserting rights which
might perhaps have otherwise existed either of property, of contract or of remedy, as against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct
and has been led thereby to change his position for
the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right either of property, of contract or of
remedy." Pomery, Equity Jurisprudence, Vol 3, Section 804, Page 189.
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This doctrine as it originally developed was not applied generally by the courts against one whose conduct consisted merely
of promises or statements of intention to do an act or a thing
in the future, but was restricted primarily to conduct involving
a representation of an existing or past fact. However, subsequently, in the development of this doctrine, the courts
have become more liberal in their application of the same
and have expanded it to include statements concerning future
facts. Pomeroy, ibid, Section 808(b); Anno at 115 A.L.R.
152. As stated by the court in the case of Fried vs. Fisher,
328 Pa. 497, 196 A. 39 115 A.L.R. 147 (1938), an estoppel
may arise from the making of a promise even though without
consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be
relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and refusal to
enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of
fraud or would result in other injustice.
Professor Williston states the doctrine to be as follows:
'There would seem, however, compelling reasons
of justice for enforcing promises, where injustice cannot otherwise be avoided, when they have led the
promisee to incur any substantial detriment on the faith
of them, not only when the promissor intended, but also
when he should reasonably have expected such detriment to be incurred though he did not request it as
an exchange for his promise." I Williston Contracts,
Revised Edition, Page 502, Paragraph 139.
The rule is laid down in the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Paragraph 90, that
"The promise which the promissor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee
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and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promises."
It is conceded that in the present case, appellant is not seeking to acquire the fee simple title by an action of specific performance, but is merely asserting his right to trail his cattle across
a portion of respondent's land for which he is willing to pay to
respondent a fair, reasonable compensation therefor. It is further conceded that the doctrine commonly known as promissory estoppel is principally applied as a substitute for consideration. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that said
doctrine is basically an equitable one, (15 A.L.R. 152 et seq.)
founded upon the desire of the courts to prevent injustice and
it is respectfully submitted that equity and justice in the case
at bar demanded the application of said doctrine to estop
respondent from asserting his rights of ownership in preventing
appellant from trailing his livestock across respondent's land
to the appellant's detriment, said trailing being a fact not only
necessary for the continuation of appellant's present livestock operation, but also constitutes an act reasonably foreseen
and anticipated by respondent at the time he promised to
convey said land.
The respective equities in the situation that now exist by
reason of the decree of the court below become even more
acutely apparent inasmuch as appellant's entire cattle operation is in jeopardy of being completely and absolutely halted
with severe attendant monetary loss to appellant, whereas
respondent's operation is completely unaffected.
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CONCLUSION
Cassity is entitled to continue to use the lands owned
by Castagno which are intermingled with the Cassity ownership in the township south of Great Salt Lake for the three
uses: to trail back and forth to and from the winter range
which is located on Stansbury Island, about 20 miles from
the intermingled summer grazing and hay land area; to trail
back and forth to and from his summer lands on the east and
on the west side of the Western Pacific Railroad; and to trail
into and from the water holes located upon the Castagno
lands, the water upon which Cassity has acquired through
continuous use for a period prior to the Utah water statute
of 1903. The Jury answered each of the interrogatories submitted to it relating to these questions favorably to the position
of Cassity, and the evidence did not support the findings of the
trial Court which, for all practical purposes nullified the
verdict of the Jury.
Under the authorities and arguments presented herein,
the judgment in this case should be reversed, and a new trial
should be granted Cassity.
Respectfully submitted,
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